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IN THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
--~~·---------·------------------------
DOCKET NO. 79-1633 
AMMONETA SEQUOYAH, ET AL. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants 
v. 
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 
Defendant-Appellee 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Tennessee, 
Northern Division 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE 
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues originally presented were: 
1. Did the district court correctly hold that 
the Government's use for Tellico Dam and Reservoir of 
land acquired from private parties for that project did 
not violate the First, Fifth, or Ninth Amendment? 
2. Should the district court's decision be 
~pheld in any event because of plaintiffs' delay in 
advancing their constitutional claims until after 13 
years had elapsed and over $111 million of public funds 
had been expended on the project? 
3. Did the district court correctly hold that 
Tellico was exempted from other laws repugnant to its 
completion by the direction in Public Law No. 96-69 that 
TVA complete and operate Tellico "notwithstanding the pro-
visions of . any other law," and were the other laws 
cited by plaintiffs of a kind which would not have pre-
vented TVA from closing the dam in any event? 
We believe all of these questions would be 
answered "yes." 
The plaintiffs, a minority of Cherokees, 
demanded in their second (November 29) motion for injunc-
tion pending appeal that disinterred Cherokee remains be 
reinterred in the original burial sites (rather than 1n a 
site above Tellico Reservoir as planned by TVA and 
approved in 1972 by the Cherokee Nation representing the 
great majority of Cherokees, and approved in 1974 by the 
Eastern Band themselves although they, unlike the Cherokee 
Nation, have since changed their minds). They further 
demanded that the Court direct the operation of Tellico 
and other TVA dams and reservoirs to accommodate such 
reinterment. 
2 
We believe they are not entitled to any such 
relief. 
The plaintiffs, in moving this Court and the 
Supreme Court for an injunction pending appeal, have 
stated that closure of Tellico would render the appeal 
moot. 
Their motions were not granted, and Tellico has 
been closed. 
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Eastern Band has expressed opposition 
to Tellico since 1965, 1 a year before the initial approf 
priation for its construction. Not until this suit, how-
ever, have they or other Cherokees based such opposition 
on religious grounds. 
In so doing in this suit, plaintiffs express the 
v1ews of only a minority of Cherokees. The Cherokee Nation, 
which has over 50,000 members, has refused to join as a 
plaintiff; has commended TVA for its archaeological program 
aimed at finding and preserving Indian artifacts in the 
area, including the elevation of a portion of the Chota 
site above reservoir level; and takes the position that 
1 The Knoxville Journal, Apr. 5, 1965, vol. 89, no. 81, 
at 1. 
3 
the land involved is important from a historical and cul-
tural standpoint, but has no religious significance.
2 
Plaintiffs brought this·suit, in the words of 
the first sentence of the complaint, to "save their 
sacred Little Tennessee River Valley from destruction by 
the TVA" (app. 1). As stated in the complaint, in their 
supporting affidavits, in their oral argument to the 
district court, and in their various briefs until their 
most recent one in support of their second motion for an 
injunction pending appeal, plaintiffs' whole purpose was 
to prevent flooding of burial and other sites by the 
waters of the reservoir. Their basic claim was that such 
inundation of the sites and their lack of future access 
to them would infringe their right to the free exercise 
of their religion, and that Public Law No. 96-69,
3 which 
directed the completion of Tellico, was therefore 
unconstitutional. 
The district court denied plaintiffs' motion 
for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the suit. The 
district court's basic holding was that plaintiffs' rights 
2 Affidavit of Principal Chief Ross 0. Swimmer at 4-5; 
see also 1973 TVA Ann. Rep. at 95-96. Chief Swimmer's 
alffldavit is included in the certified record on appeal as 
a part of item 5 and is reprinted as an appendix to this 
brief. 
3 Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act, 1980, 
93 Stat. 437, 449 (Sept. 25, 1979). 
4 
.. 
under the First Amendment do not extend to preventing the 
Government's legitimate use of its own lands, as to which 
neither plaintiffs nor their ancestors have or have had 
any ownership interest or any right of access for at least 
140 years. 
Plaintiffs appealed and sought to enjoin closure 
of the dam and flooding oj the reservoir pending appeal. 
Their applications for such an injunction were successively 
denied by the district court, a panel of this Court, and 
Justices Stewart and Brennan of the Supreme Court. 
Plaintiffs then filed a petition for rehearing of the 
denial by this Court. 
On November 29, TVA closed Tellico and began 
filling the reservoir. Since then, the water has risen 
from elevation 739 to elevation 800 (as of December 17). 
TVA expects that th~ reservoir will be at full winter 
pool (elevation 807) before the end of December. 
On November 29, plaintiffs served a new motion 
in this Court for an injunction pending appeal. In so 
doing, they changed their position in three basic respects: 
First, plaintiffs had previously stated to both 
this Court and the Supreme Court that closure of Tellico 
would "make moot all of the questions raised by this suit."
4 
4 Reply brief of appellants in response to brief of 
appellee TVA in opposition to motion for injunction pend-
ing appeal (at 2). Other such statements by plaintiffs 
are noted infra at 36-37. 
5 
Tellico has been closed. Plaintiffs nevertheless sought 
a second injunction pending appeal, this time to compel 
reinterment of Indian remains in the original burial 
sites and operation of Tellico to permit this. 
Second, the complaint and plaintiffs' presenta-
tions to the district court, this Court, and the Supreme 
Court, had sought to prevent flooding of the Tellico 
Reservoir altogether. As previously noted, their case 
was based on the argument--supported by their affidavits--
that inundation of burial and other sites would violate 
their First Amendment rights. Although they did ask that 
previously removed remains be reinterred, this was inci-
dental to their basic contention that all burial sites 
must be left uncovered by water. Indeed, they advanced 
this contention in their brief on the merits in this 
Court (at 18, 27-28). 
Having thus originally claimed that it was the 
inuridation of burial sites--disturbed or undisturbed--
which would interfere with their religious freedom, they 
changed their position in the memorandum supporting their 
November 29 motion to state that if previously removed 
Indian remains were reinterred 1n the original burial 
sites, TVA would "then be free to continue flooding the 
Valley" (at 5). 
Third, although plaintiffs originally sought to 
prohibit creation of a reservo1r at Tellico, their second 
6 
injunction motion asked instead that the Court direct the 
operation of Tellico. Moreover, as pointed out infra (at 
34-35), the manner of operation they demanded would be 
incompatible with the TVA Act and with the public interest. 
It is TVA's belief that none of the positions 
taken by plaintiffs has merit, and that the district 
court's decision should e.i ther be affirmed, or the appeal 
dismissed as moot. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
Plaintiffs' Original Claims 
Are Without Merit. 
A. The_district court correctly held that plaintiffs 
could not prevent the Government from using its 
land for aaam and reservoir lroj ec t by a 
claim that such use will vio ate their 
rights under the First, Fifth, and 
Ninth Amendments. 
Plaintiffs have no property interest in the 
land involved, and neither they nor their ancestors have 
had any property interest in it or right of access to it 
for 140 years. Cherokee occupation of the Tellico area 
did not begin until about 1700.
5 It officially ended 
with the signing of Calhoun's treaty in 1819, 7 Stat. 195, 
5 Plaintiffs' exhibit B at 22. 
7 
by which the Cherokee Nation ceded to the United States 
all of their lands in the area. The Cherokees ceded 
their remaining lands east of the Mississippi to the 
United States by the Treaty of New Echota in 1835, 
7 Stat. 478. Most of them thereafter traveled over the 
Trail of Tears to the lands set aside for them west of 
the Mississippi River. Individual Cherokees who did not 
do so "dissolved their connection with their Nation when 
they refused to accompany the body of it on its removal" 
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. United States & 
Cherokee Nation, 117 U.S. 288, 309 (1886). 
The county land records show that any lands 
held by individual Cherokees in the Tellico area were 
6 
sold by 1838, and title to all land in the area was 
thereafter in private non-Cherokee ownership until the 
Unit~d States acquired it for the Tellico project. 7 
Indeed, the plaintiff Eastern Band thems~lves stated to 
the Supreme Court in an amicus brief filed in Tennessee 
Yal_l~y_Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), that their 
6 Affidavit of John Linn; these records are, of course, 
also subject to judicial notice. 
7 Section 4(h) of the TVA Act, 16 U.S.C. § 83lc(h) 
(1976), provides that title to all land acquired for TVA 
projects shall be taken in the name of the United States, 
and that such land shall be entrusted to TVA as the agent 
of the United States to accomplish the purposes of the 
TVA Act. 
8 
last residence in the Little Tennessee River Valley dated 
from a time "[p]rior to the Treaty of New Echota in 1835 
and the cession of their remaining lands east of the 
Mississippi River," and that they reside on a reservation 
in North Carolina created in 1924. 
The district court, in dismissing this suit, 
noted the holdings in Ab.ington School Dist. v. Schempp, 
374 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963), and other cited cases, that 
some form of coercion of actions contrary to religious 
beliefs is an essential element of a claim under the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 8 It then held: 
The Court has been cited to no case that en-
grains the free exercise clause with property 
rights. The free exercise clause is not a 
license in itself to enter property, government-
owned or otherwise, to which religious practi-
tioners have no other legal right of access 
[ app. 19] . 
This holding is supported by the one case in 
which, to our knowledge, a similar religious claim has 
8 Plaintiffs state that the district court erred in 
describing such cases as requiring a showing of coercive 
governmental action in a First Amendment free exercise 
case because these cases "talk in terms of the coercive 
'effect,' not of coercive action" (brief of appellants 
at 16). 
This is mere semantics and a distinction without a 
difference. When the Supreme Court said in Abington that 
"it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show 
the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates 
against him in the practice of his religion," it obviously 
meant governmental action through legislation having a 
coercive effect. This could certainly be referred to, 
without error, as "coercive action." 
9 
been directly raised, and by a long line of decisions 
dealing with the Government's power under the Property 
Clause of the Constitution (art. Iy, § 3, cl. 2) with 
respect to its own property. 
The one case dealing with a similar religious 
claim is Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 
1977), ?Ppeal docket~~~ No. 78-1517 (lOth Cir.) (notice 
of appeal filed May 25, 1978). In Badoni, Navajo Indians 
and organizations contended that operation of Glen Canyon 
Dam and use of a related area by tourists were resulting 
in 
... destruction of holy sites; the drowning 
of entities recognized as gods by the plain-
tiffs; prevention of plaintiffs from performing 
religious ceremonies; desecration of holy sites, 
especially abodes of gods of the plaintiffs, by 
tourists; and, by virtue of all this, injury to 
the efficacy of plaintiffs' religious prayers, 
and entreaties to their remaining gods [at 644]. 
In denying an injunction sought on the basis of the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and granting sum-
mary judgment for the Government, the court stated: 
The court feels that the lack of a property 
interest is determinative of the First Amend-
ment question and agrees with defendants that 
plaintiffs have no cognizable claim under the 
circumstances presented [id.]. 
There, moreover, the land involved was within the bounda-
ries of the Navajo Indian Reservation, although not a 
part of it (id.). Here, Tellico is some 50 miles from 
the reservation occupied by the Eastern Band of Cherokee 
10 
Indians in North Carolina, and of course many times that 
distance from any l~nds occupied by the plaintiff United 
Ketooah Band in Oklahoma. 
The Property Clause and cases interpreting and 
applying it were discussed at length in Kleppe v. New 
Mexi~Q, 426 U.S. 529 (1976). The Supreme Court there 
reaffirmed the basic prin~iple stated in Light v. United 
States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911), which it cited and relied 
on, that: 
"The government has with respect to its own 
land the rights of an ordinary proprietor 
to maintain its possession and prosecute 
trespassers. It may deal with such lands 
precisely as an ordinary individual may 
deal with his farming property .... " 
The United States can prohibit absolutely or 
fix the terms on which its property may be 
used. As it can withhold or reserve the 
land it can do so indefinitely ... [220 
U.S. at 536]. 
The availability of public property for First 
Amendment expression depends, as the Supreme Court made 
clear in Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), on the 
use to which such property is dedicated. If it consti-
tutes a "public place" or "public forum," it is available 
for use on a basis free from discrimination or unrea-
sonable regulation. If it does not, the public may be 
wholly excluded. As the Supreme Court stated in Adderley, 
in rejecting petitioners' claim that they had a constitu-
tional right of access to jail grounds for demonstration 
purposes: 
11 
Traditionally, state capitol grounds are open 
to the public. Jails, built for security pur-
poses, are not. . . 
. . . The State, no less than a private owner 
of ro ert , has ower to reserve the ro -
ert~ un er 1ts contra or t e use to w ic 
it 1s lawfull dedicated. For this reason 
t ere is no merit to t e petit1oners' argument 
that they had a constitutional right to stay 
on the proper~, over the jail custodian's 
Objections, oecause this "area chosen for the 
peaceful civil rights demonstration was not 
only 'reasonable' but also particularly appro-
priate .... " Such an argument has as its 
major unarticulated premise the assumption that 
people who want to propagandize protests or 
views have a constitutional right to do so when-
ever and however and wherever they please. 
That concept of constitutional law was vigor-
ously and forthrightly rejected in two of the 
cases petitioners rely on, Cox v. Louisiana 
[379 U.S. 536, 539]. We reject it again. The 
United States Constitution does not forbid a 
State to control the use of its own property 
for its own law~u1 nondiscriminatory purpose 
[at 41, 47-48]. · 
Adderley has been followed in numerous subse-
quent decisions. Se~, ~' Knight v. Anderson, 480 F.2d 
8, 10 (9th Cir. 1973); Benson_ v. Rich, 448 F.2d 1371, 
1373 (lOth Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972); 
UI?ited~_§tates v. Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d 868, 874 (4th Cir.), 
cert __ . denied, 397 U.S. 1044 (1970); United States v. 
Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074, 1079 (4th Cir. 1972); Hurley v. 
Hi~ckl~y. 304 F. Supp. 704 (D. Mass. 1969) (three-judge 
court), ?ff'd sub nom. Doyle v. O'Brien, 396 U.S. 277 (1970); 
·----------···-···------
-----------------------
----------
9 Emphasis added unless otherwise noted. 
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~J~~I!(~_s v. _District of Columbia Armory Bd., 438 F.2d 138, 
lLf0-l~l (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
The First Amendment cases cited by plaintiffs 
are in no way inconsistent and afford no support for 
their position. Those cases fall without exception into 
one of two categories: first, those which involve regu-
lation of personal conduct rather than use of government 
property; 10 and second, those which deal with government 
property but hold only that the exercise of First Amend-
ment rights cannot be arbitrarily or discriminatorily 
exc.luded from property dedicated for use as "public fora", I 
or "public places" (such as streets and parks). 11
 
10 McDaniel v. Pa§t' 435 U.S. 618 (1978); Procunier v. 
Martinez, 416 U.S. 76 (1974); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. Ln5 (1972); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 
U.S. 713 (1971); Shapiro v. Tho97son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); 
~El?_~_!:"son v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. (T968); United States 
v. Se3ey8r, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U.S~ . -(1963); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624 ( 1943); Kenne_4y v. Meacha~, 540 F. 2d 1057 
(lOth Cir. 1976); Teterud v. Gillman, 385 F. Supp. 153 
(S.D. Iowa 1974), aff'dsub nom. Teterud v. Burns, 522 
F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975); People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813 
(Cal. 1964). 
11 Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); 
Neimotko v. Mar~land, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Kunz v. New 
Yor~, 340 U.S.90 (1951); Murdock v. PennsyYVania,~9 
U.~ 105 ( 1943); C¥iplinsky v. New Hamtshire, Jr5--U. S. 
568 (1942); Cantwe v. Connecticut, 3 0 U.S. 296 (1940); 
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Women Strike for Peace 
v. Morton~72 F.2d 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1972); A guaker 
ActiOn Gro~ v. Hickel, 421 F.2d 1111 (D.C. C1r. 1969); 
Dnlted States v. Silberman, 464 F. Supp. 866 (M.D. Fla. 
1~79); United States v. Boesewetter, 463 F. Supp. 370 
(D.C. Cir. 1978). Some of these cases, ~' Murdock and 
Chaplins~, also involve elements of pla1nt1ffs' first 
type of case. 
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Plaintiffs contend that a "compelling state 
interest test" should be applied by balancing Tellico 
against plaintiffs' desire to keep burial and other sites 
uncovered by water. Plaintiffs are mistaken. In the two 
types of cases they cite, where there is a direct clash 
between rights possessed both by individual plaintiffs 
and the Government, a balancing is of course required. 
An example related to their first type of case 1s whether 
the right of parents to educate their children in 
accordance with their religious or other convictions is 
outweighed by a compelling governmental interest in the 
education of children generally. This was the kind of 
question presented in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972)--and much earlier in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510 (1925). An example related to their second 
type of case is whether the right of individuals to use 
the public streets for parades or other purposes is 
outweighed by a governmental interest in keeping par-
ticular streets clear for vehicular traffic. Compare Cox 
v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-78 (1941) and Grayned 
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 113, 115-16 (1972) 
wi_t~b Hague v. CIO, '307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) and 
Sh':lttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 155-56 (1969). 
Where, on the other hand, the Government is 
simply using property it owns for a purpose which is 
14 
incompatible with its availability for First Amendment 
expression, no question of balancing arises. Adderley 
and the cases following it accordingly do not utilize 
any "compelling State interest test" nor engage in any 
"balancing" of public and private interests in such a 
situation. 
Here, of course, the lands involved were 
acquired for just one purpose--the construction and 
impoundment of Tellico. As the district court correctly 
noted, since the Government owns the property and the 
exclusion from it by reason of the impoundment will apply 
equally to plaintiffs and everyone else, plaintiffs have 
no arguable claim under either the First or Fifth Amend-
ment.12 As it further noted, the Ninth Amendment cer-
tainly does not restrict the Government's exercise of 
the normal incidents of ownership of its property. See 
Ashwa~d~~ v. Jennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 
330-31 (1936). Such Ninth Amendment claims were rejected 
with respect to Tellico in earlier litigation over the 
------------
------------
------------
-
12 Moreover, for the Government to use the lands 
involved to accommodate plaintiffs' religious beliefs 
rather than for public benefit through completion of the 
project would discriminate against the public and raise 
serious questions under the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment. See, ~_._g__._, Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 
349, 363-72 (1975);-Gilrette ~nited States, 401 U.S. 
437, 449-50 (1971); O'Malley v. Brierley, 477 F.2d 785, 
789 (3d Cir. 1973). 
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project . Env ~.r:.<?~l~<-~!!.t al ___ Q_~ fens.~ _ _lund v. Tep_ne s~-~~---Y.~ll ~-
~l!thor:_~lJ:', /~92 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974), aff'g Civ. No. 
7720 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 1973). See also Duck River 
Preservation Ass'n v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 529 
F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1976), aff'g 4 E.R.C. 1892, 1893-94 
(E.D. Tenn. 1972). 
Indeed, if the law on these points were other-
wise, no land could be acquired for any federal, state, 
or municipal public purpose--whether a dam and reservoir, 
an office building, a jail, or a military reservation--
with any assurance that it could be so used if any group 
were to assert that such use would conflict with their 
religious beliefs or needs. 
B. The district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' 
---religious claims was correct in any event 
because of plaintiffs' laches. 
The district court found that: 
[P]laintiffs have known about the project and 
its attendant First Amendment issues since 
1965. Although enjoined twice by the courts, 
the project has been free from any injunction 
for at least nine of the last fourteen years. 
It is difficult to understand why plaintiffs 
have waited until now to raise their consti-
tutional arguments in court [app. 15]. 
Although the district court found it unneces-
sary to decide whether laches bar plaintiffs' claims 
(app. 20), we submit that laches would be an alternative 
ground for upholding its decision. 
16 
Plaintiffs could have sued to test their reli-
gious claims when construction funds for the project were 
first appropriated in 1966. Their cause of action there-
fore arose, if at all, at that time. Lathan v. Volpe, 
455 F.2d 1111, 1122 (9th Cir. 1971); Mansfield Area Citi-
zens 9S~~~ v. United States, 413 F. Supp. 810, 824-25 
(M.D. Pa. 1976). 
The Eastern Band's past opposition to the proj-
ect has been expressed to both Congress and the Supreme 
Court. A presentation to Congress in 1966, immediately 
preceding the initial appropriation for Tellico, stated 
that they were "actively opposed" to the project; that 
they "will suffer the final desecration of their ancient 
homelands if Tellico Dam is built"; and that " [ t]he 
Cherokees have petitioned that the place of their fore-
bears be preserved as a part of their rightful heritage."
12 
Actual construction of Tellico began in March 
1967. 13 Construction proceeded until 1972, when it was 
halted by an injunction based on TVA's not having filed 
an environmental impact statement after the effective 
date of the National Environmental Policy Act and in 
support of its subsequent requests for appropriations for 
12 !!~arings on H.R. 17787 Before the Subcomm. of the Se~~te Comm. on Appropriations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 73, 
7E, 71J-( 1966) . 
1:3 1967 TVA Ann. Rep. at 25-27. 
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h . t 14 teprOJCC~. An impact statement was then filed, the 
in_juncLion was dissolved, and applications for an injunc-
tion pending appeal were filed in and denied by the 
district court, this Court, and the Supreme Court. The 
applicants for that injunction, with whom the Eastern 
Band actively cooperated throughout the litigation, 
contended in their applications in this Court and the 
Supreme Court that "the nature of the irreparable harm" 
which they would suffer lay in the fact that: 
[T]he Little Tennessee Valley is of great his-
torical importance. It was the sacred homeland 
of the Cherokee Indians, and is the site of 
numerous Cherokee villages. . . . Each of these 
sites will be inundated . . . . Accordingly, a 
consideration of irreparable harm in the present 
instance goes far beyond the mere movement of 
earth or condemnation of land. It goes, of neces-
sity, to the heritage of a proud and ravished 
people and to an historical continuity 6f impor-
tance to all Americans. 
This Court denied a stay on November 9, 1973 (No. 7Ll-
1139). Mr. Justice Stewart, to whom the application was 
then directed, referred it to the whole Supreme Court, 
which denied it on November 19, 1973, 414 U.S. 1036. 
The Eastern Band again presented their views in 
two amicus briefs filed with the Supreme Court in 
T~-[l~fl:~~-~ee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
See 434 U.S. 954 (1977); 435 U.S. 920 (1978). Their 
14 Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley 
Auth9rJ}j~,--TJ<J F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 
1T67J l'6th Cir. 1972). 
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first mot ion for leave stated that the Band "has unique 
h i:jt(~~ i·_caJ~_.!!I1_cL C.t::!:l_tur:al __ interests in the lands sought to 
be impounded . and that Congress is the proper forum 
f9.r:- ~_eig_!ling_ these interests against those of [TVA]" (at 
1-2). Their first brief elaborated on this theme. It 
listed the sites involved and discussed their "unique and 
profound significance in the history and culture of the 
Cherokee people" (at 2). Noting the "special relevance" 
to underst~nding "Indian cultures" of "[a]rchaeological 
deposits and burial grounds" (at 3), it concluded: 
If the petitioner is successful in this case, 
these lands will be flooded and further research 
and study, further recourse to this valley will 
be lost forever to the Cherokee people. If 
this Court leaves the decision of the Court of 
Appeals standing as a final ruling, the ques-
tions raised by petitioner may be balanced by 
Congress [emphasis in original] against the 
values represented by the Respondents together 
with the unique values to the Cherokee people. 
In the Congressional forum the Cherokee people 
can point out that: 
The white man saves the whooping crane, 
he saves the goose in Hawaii, but he 
is not saving the way of life of the 
Indian. 
On behalf of the Cherokee people and other 
Indian people who continue to have sacred land 
damaged and destroyed, the Eastern Band of 
Cherokee Indians urges the Court to deny cer-
t1orar1 1n this case and leave these Tolitical 
~~estions to be resolved by Congress at 3-4]. 
Congress did resolve these questions, after debates in 
which the interests of the Cherokees were forcefully pre-
sented. §~-~. ~' 125 Cong. Rec. S9632 (daily eel. 
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July 17, 1979) (Senator Kennedy); 125 Cong. Rec. S7551 
(d:Jily eel. June 1:3, 1979) (statement of Charles Schultze); 
CC'l ( 'h f"f" ) 15 :md id . .:~t S7.)>L Senator Ca .. ee . 
Then, disappointed with the congressional 
determination they themselves sought, and with construc-
tion of the dam completed and the reservoir ready for 
flooding, plaintiffs filed the present suit in which they 
raised for the first time objections predicated on reli-
gious grounds. 
We think it clear that under all accepted prin-
ciplcs of equity, parties cannot thus sit back while over 
$111 million is spent on construction of a project over a 
peridd of 13 years and then--when construction is complete 
and the project is ready to operate--seek to enjoin it on 
the basis of religious claims advanced for the first 
time. The courts have often so held in comparable situa-
tions. !<:___.__&_._, United States ex rel. Arant v. Lan~, 249 
lJ.S. 367, 372 (1919); Clark v. Volpe, 342 F. Supp. 1324, 
1 3 2 9 ( E . D . La . ) , a (f'j_ , 4 61 F . 2 d 12 6 6 ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 7 2 ) ; 
!-illh_<!_n v. Vg_!:Q_~, 455 F.2d 1111, 1122 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(constitutional claim barred); Barthelmes v. Morris, 342 
15 Congress' determination of the public policy issue 
involved is of course conclusive. See United States v. 
T~~_Q_s-t1issouri Freight Ass 'n, 166 U~ 290, 340 (1897). 
Accoru, KI~ v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 541 n.10 {19T6}; Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 
19/-J (] 978"). --
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l~ __ ______;__ _________ 
F. Supp. 153, 159-61 (D. Md. 1972) (constitutional claim 
barred); Mansfield Area Citizens Group v. United States, 
413 F. Supp. 810, 824-25 (M.D. Pa. 1976); Baskin v. 
'!~~!lne§_E_~e Valley Authority, 382 F. Supp. 641, 645-46 
(M.D. Tenn. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 1402 (6th Cir. 1975). 16 
Plaintiffs argued below that laches should not 
apply because they were d~ligent in pursuing other reme-
dies; because such an application would frustrate public 
policy; and because laches are not applicable to consti-
tutional claims (plaintiffs 1 reponse to defendant's 
motion to dismiss, or in the alternative for summary 
judgment at 31-36). These arguments are without merit 
for·a number of reasons. 
First, plaintiffs have sought to assert indi-
vidual rights, not those of the public. In fact, they 
represent only a minority of the Cherokee people since 
16 In applying laches, federal courts normally look to 
the applicable state statute of limitations. As the 
Supreme Court said in Benedict v. Cit~ of New York, 250 
l.J.s. 321, 327 (1919), "While ... fe eral courts sitting 
1n equity are not bound by state statutes of limitations 
... they are, under ordinary circumstances, guided by 
them in determining their action on stale claims. 11 
.. In_this instance, the applicable statute is the pro-
VlSlon 1n Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-304 (1955) that "Actions 
for . . . injuries to the person . . . shall be commenced 
within one (1) year after cause of action accrued." See 
B_s>!e~ v. Fox, 403 F. Supp. 253, 254 (E.D. Tenn. 1975)--
{constitutlonal claim); Erwin v. Neal, 494 F.2d 1351, 
1352 (6th Cir. 1974) (constltutionar-claim); Robinson v. 
Te!ln~ssee Valley Authorit}, Civ. No. 3-77-163, at 8-10 
TR:TI.teiin:-- ug. -rL, 1977 , appeal dismissed, No. 77-1661 
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the Cherokee Nation has declined to participate in this 
suit. Second, the expressed public policy, as plainly 
set out by Congress in Public Law No. 96-69, is that the 
project shall be completed and operated. Third, even if 
plaintiffs represented "the public," laches will bar 
claims on behalf of the public. Organizations United for 
ts_~!~ v. Bell, 446 F. Supp. 535 (M.D. Pa. 1978); Lathan 
v. \1~1.£~~, 455 F. 2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971); Sierra Club v. 
C~~y~_nauE_h, 447 F. Supp. 427, 429 (D. S.D. 1978); Woida 
v. U_!!i!_eLStates, 446 F. Supp. 1377, 1390 (D. Minn. 
1978). Fourth, pursuing other remedies is an inadequate 
excuse for delay. Organizations United for Ecology v. 
B~::_J~d_, ?_l!PrC!; Dav_!_?_ v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 214 F. 
Supp. 229, 232-33 (N.D. Ala. 1962), "aff'd on the able 
9_Q_i_rl_~on of the tr~al court," 313 F. 2d 959 (5th Cir, 
1963). Neither is ignorance of remedies, br even faulty 
advice of counsel. Baskin v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 
382 F. Supp. 641, 646 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 
1402 (6th Cir. 1975). Finally, laches do apply to con-
stitutional claims, as shown by the cases cited supra 
at 20-21, and note 16. 
16 (cont.) (6th Cir. Sept. 6, 1978) (constitutional 
claim); Carney v. Smith, 437 S.W.2d 246, 247-48 (Tenn. 
1?69) (desecration of family cemetery). And a motion to 
d1sm~ss is the proper way to raise laches when, as here, 
the facts are apparent--indeed admitted--on the face of 
the pleadings. Baskin, s)pra; Russell v. Thomas, 129 F. 
Supp. 605 (S.D. Cal. 195 . 
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c. The ~g§.t rjc_t court correc tll ~eld that Public Law No. 96-69 exempted Te l1co from other 
1i.iw·s-repughant to its completion, and 
-----tJle ot er laws would not have 
----prevented its completion 
in any event. 
(1) The Exemption Is Clear. 
Public Law No. 96-69 provides that: 
[N]otwithstanding the provisions of 16 U.S.C., 
cnapter 35 or an~ other law, the Corporation is 
authorized and d1rected to complete construction, 
operate and maintain the Tellico Dam and Reser-
voir project for navigation, flood control, 
electric power generation and other purposes, 
including the maintenance of a normal summer 
reservoir pool of 813 feet above sea level [93 
Stat. 449-50 (1979)]. 
This language is certainly clear and unambiguous. 
As the district court held: 
There is nothing implied or ambiguous about this 
language ., . . . 
. . . The language exempting the Tellico Dam 
project from "any other law" is clear and 
explicit. The creation of a reservoir will 
necessarily prevent access to many of plain-
tiffs' sacred sites. If the statutes cited 
by plaintiffs do guarantee access to these 
sites, as argued by plaintiffs, they are 
unavoidably repugnant to Congress's order to 
complete the dam. Congress has clearly and 
expressly exempted the Tellico Reservoir 
from any law repugnant to its completion 
[ app. 17-18] . 
In such cases, 
if [the language of the statute] is plain, 
and if the law is within the constitutional 
authority of the law-making body which passed 
it, the sole function of the courts is to 
enforce it according to its terms {Caminetti 
v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)]. 
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~~cord, Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 366 
F.2d 238, 242 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 
1005 (1967); Hilliard v. United States, 310 F.2d 631 (6th 
Cir. 1962). The continuing vitality of this plain meaning 
rule was reaffirmed in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 
437 U.S. 153, 184 n.29 (1978). 
Here, moreoveri the statutory language accords 
with the clear legislative purpose of Public Law No. 96-69 
to mandate completion of a virtually completed project. 
As stated by its sponsor, Representative Duncan of 
Tennessee: 
The purpose of my amendment is to establish in 
law the Congress desire to see that the 
Tellico Dam and Reservoir is completed and used 
as designed .... 
. . . My amendment would make it clear that 
the Congress intends for this project to be 100 
tercent comnlete and used as desirned [125 
ong. Rec. 4663 (daily ed. June 8, 1979)]. 
Courts will go to great lengths to carry out such clearly 
expressed legislative purposes. See Church of the Holy 
IIini~ v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459-65 (1892); 
Mar~han! v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404, 408-09 (1945). 
Plaintiffs point to D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns~ 
Inc. v. yolpe, 434 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1970), as indi-
eating that perhaps the words "any other law" in the 
statute do not mean what they say. In the first place, 
that 2-1 decision of the District of Columbia Circuit 
24 
has been discredited even as to what it holds. See Chief 
Justice Burger's statement at 405 U.S. 1030-31 (1972): 
1 concur in the denial of certiorari in this 
case, but solely out of considerations of 
timing. Questions of great importance to the 
Washington, D.C., area are presented by the 
petition, not the least of which is whether the 
Court of Appeals has, for a second time, unjus-
tifiably frustrated the efforts of the Executive 
Branch to com I with the will of Con ress as 
rat er c ear y exlresse in o t e Fe eral-
Aid Highway Act o 1968 . If we were to 
grant the writ, however, it would be almost a 
year before we could render a decision in the 
case. It seems preferable, therefore, that we 
stay our hand. In these circumstances Congress 
may, of course, take any further legislative 
action it deems necessary to make unmistakably 
clear its intentions with respect to the [Three 
Sisters Bridge] project, even to the point of 
limiting or prohibiting judicial review of its 
directives in this respect. 
Further, the statutory language there was deemed by the 
court to be ambiguous (434 F.2d at 438); the legislative 
history was thought to support the court's interpretation 
(id. at 444); and such interpretation was also supported 
by the ('ont:cmporaneous administrative construction (id_:_ 
at 41~5) . 
Here none of these elements is present. The 
language is clear. The administrative construction accords 
with it. And the legislative history shows--without dis-
P~l~ _ _J?_£_~ontradiction--that Congress meant just what it 
said. For example, Senator Chaffee stated during the 
Senate debate on the provision: 
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Mr. President, I merely note that this is 
extraordinary language. It provides that 
notwithstanding the provisions of 16 U.S.C., 
or any other law, TVA is authorized to pro-
ceed with this. 
It means they are exempt from all other laws 
--workmen's compensation, clean water, historic 
~eservation, Davis-Bacon--any other law that 
exists in the books, they are exempt from under 
Ihe extraordinary lan~uage we are considering 
nere [125 Cong. Rec. 12,279 (daily ed. 
sept. 10, 1979)]. 
Senator Culver similarly stated: 
What we are talking about here, make no mistake 
about it, is not only the waiver of the Endan-
gered Species Act, ... but also waiving all 
laws--all laws and all Federal statutes entered 
Into that impact on this project [id. at Sl2,275]. 
S~_e. ____ .clj_~9 125 Cong. Rec. S9631 (daily ed. July 17, 1979) , 
remar~s of Senator Heinz ("Besides exempting the project 
from the endangered species law, it would also exempt 
the project from any other law that might in some way 
affect the project 11 ); j.d. at S9630, remarks of Senator 
Chaffee ("lt says that notwithstanding the Endangered 
Species Act or any other act--any other act, whether it 
is the Clean Water Act, the Historic Preservation Act, 
whatever it might be, any other law that is on the books--
this dam can go ahead"); id~, remarks of Senator Culver 
("Now we arE' ordering TVA to go ahead and build the dam, 
whether TVA wants it or not, waiving everything''); 125 
Cong. Rec. H7215 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1979), remarks of 
26 
Heprcsentative Breaux (This bill "exempts the Tellico 
project in Tennessee from all laws") . 17 
Plaintiffs also relied on Tennessee Valley 
A~_th_ori_!j: v. !:fill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). That case is 
inapposite since, as the district court noted, it involved 
the question of whether an exemption could be implied, 
and not, as here, whether an express exemption should be 
given effect in accordance with its terms. 
(2) The Statutes Cited by Plaintiffs 
Did Not Confer on Them the 
Rights Which They Claim. 
The three statutes cited by plaintiffs were the 
~1erican Indian Religious Freedom Act (Pub. L. No. 95-341, 
92 Stat. 469 (1978)), the National Historic Preservation 
Act (16 U.S.C. §§ 470 et seq. (1976)), and a Tennessee 
statute regulating graves (Tenn. Code Ann. § 46-401 (1964 
repl. ) ) ( app. 8, fj] 23) . 
The American Indian Religious Freedom Act, on 
which they principally relied, conferred no such rights 
--- ---- --- ----- -----
I? Plaintiffs attempted to downgrade this legislative 
history by arguing that the statements were made by oppo-
nents rather than proponents of the Tellico project. But 
these statements were in no way contradicted by proponents. 
And as the Supreme Court made clear in a similar situation, 
s~atements of opponents are "relevant and useful, espe-
Cially wherE!, as here, the proponents of the bill made no 
resp?nse to the opponents' criticisms." Arizona v. Cali-
~~~' 373 U.S. 546, 583 n.85 (1963). Accord, United 
utates v. Board of Comm'rs of Sheffield, Ala., 435 U.S. 
§i~,,I30-3I-U978); Parlane Sportswear co-:-v:- Weinbereyer, 
( 197
F.2d 835, 837 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 25 
5). 
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as they claim. The Act simply expressed a general policy 
and does not obligate federal agencies to make any changes 
which would interfere with their statutorily authorized 
programs. Jndeed, plaintiffs themselves stated in their 
response to TVA's motion in the district court that this 
Act did not "impose[] specific changes upon the TVA" (at 
The Act's legislative history makes this per-
feet 1 y c 1 ea 1·. As originally proposed, it would have 
required federal agencies, after evaluation, to implement 
changes in their actions. See 124 Cong. Rec. H6879 (daily 
ed. July 18, 1978). After the implementation requirement 
was severely criticized by the Department of Justice 
(S. Rep. No. 95-709, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1978)), it 
was stricken. Jsf~ at 1, 6; 124 Cong. Rec. H6879-80 (daily 
ed. July 18, 1978). Congressman Udall, the sponsor of 
the legislation in the House, made the effect of this 
change cryslal clear: 
1 have sent the bill to the desk with 
illuendment to strike a hrase re uirin 
mcnt agenc1es to imp ement c anges in aw 
to accommodate religious practices of Indians 
where infringements have been identified. That 
is the responsibility of Congress. 
J-
" 
_,_ 
" 
_,_ 
" 
Mr. Speaker, it is not the intent of my bill 
to wipe out laws passed for the benefit of the 
general public or to confer special religious 
~ights on Indians. 
·'-
" 
_,_ 
1\ 
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All this simple little resolution says 
to the Forest Service, to the Park Service, to 
the managers of public lands is that if there 
is a place where Indians traditionally con re-
fate to ho one o t eir rites an ceremonies, 
et them come on unless there is some overriding 
reason why they should not. 
..L 
" 
J • 
" 
It has no teeth in it. It is the sense 
of the Congress [id. at H6871-73]. 
He thereafter asked for inclusion in the record of a letter 
from the Department of Justice, saying: 
The letter states that it is the Department's 
understanding that this resolution in and of 
itself, does not change any existing State or 
Federal law. That, of course, is the [House] 
committee's understanding and intent [id. 
at H6872]. 
-
The National Historic Preservation Act similarly 
does not prohibit projects affecting archaeologically or 
historically important sites, but rather requires programs 
lo ameliorate their effects. More than $3 million has been 
spent for that purpose in connection with the Tellico 
project. 
As for the Tennessee statute, plaintiffs appar-
ently have abandoned on appeal any claim with respect to 
it. In any event, it is too well established to call 
for extended argument that the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution renders it inapplicable. As stated by this 
Court in Co~nonwealth of Ky. ex rel. Hancock v. Ruckelshaus, 
497 F.2d 1172 (6th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 426 U.S. 167 (1976): 
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The TVA defendants do not claim sovereign 
immunity from suit, but do maintain that the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Consti-
tution exempts federal agencies and officials 
in the performance of their duties from state 
and local regulations. From the time of 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 
4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), this has been a settled 
principle of our federalism. See Mayo v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 441, 445-448, 63 S.Ct. 
1137, 87 L.Ed. 1504 (1943). The doctrine has 
been held applicable to TVA. Posey v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority, 93 F.2d 726, 727 
(5th Cir. 1937) [at 1176]. 
Accord, Tennessee Valley Authority v. Kinzer, 142 F.2d 
833, 837 (6th Cir. 1944); Rainbow Realty Co. v. Tennessee 
VaLA_~y _ _Au~_hority, 124 F. Supp. 436, 441 (M.D. Tenn. 1954) 
(three-judge court). 
Finally, plaintiffs contend that exemption of 
Tellico from these statutes would in itself raise a con-
stitutional question. Since the statutes do not confer 
on plaintiffs any rights which would interfere with the 
use of the Jederal lands involved for statutorily author-
ized prograrns or projects, no constitutional question can 
be raised by a statute which mandates completion of a pro-
ject on lands acquired for that purpose. In any event, 
under the att thor i ties cited the cons ti tu tional authority 
of Congress to direct that particular federal property be 
used for a designated public purpose is not open to rea-
sonable question. 
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II 
Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled To Demand 
-Reinterment of Remains in Original 
- s~tes and Operation of Teilico 
To Accommodate Such 
Re1nterment. 
Plaintiffs are not legally entitled to demand 
any reinterment of remain~ in original sites or direction 
by the Court of the operation of Tellico to accommodate 
such reinterment. In addition, the factual situation 
would compel rejection of the demand in any event. 
Their demand is wholly without basis from a 
legal standpoint because of the well established rule 
that the Government can, in connection with a public 
project, remove remains from one location and reinter 
them at ano t:her. 
Thus, burial grounds are subject to condemnation 
even though recognized as "sacred places." As noted in 
~~it~_q_?t~tes v. Sixty Acres, Mbre or Less, of Land, 28 F. 
Supp. 368 (E.D. Ill. 1939): 
[G]reat governmental projects, like the Norris 
Dam in Tennessee, similar in their essential 
physical needs and results to the project 
here involved, could not and would not have 
been constructed had the law prevented the 
condemnation of public cemeteries and the 
rc~moval of the bodies of the dead thererrom 
Tat 374]. 
Acc<?,rd, United States ex rel. TVA v. Vogle, 28 F. Supp. 
454, 455 (W.D. Ky. 1939); City of New Orleans v. Christ 
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rch Cgr:-P_:_• 81 So. 2d 855; 859-60 (La. 1955); In re Bd. 
of St. _QE~:_nings & Improvement, 31 N.E. 102, 104 (N.Y. Ct. 
""-~~·-·~~--·- -··-· 
App. 1892); 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain§ 85, at 345-46 
(1965). Disinterment and reburial at other locations are 
common in situations of various types. See, ~' 
lers Ins. Co. v. Welch, 82 F.2d 799, 801 (5th Cir. 
··--·-·--- --------
1936); ~~domer Russ-Pol Unterstitzing Verein v. Posner, 
4 A.2d 71~3, 745 (Md. Ct. App. 1939); Cf. Mallen v. Mallen, 
520 S.W.2d 736, 737 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974). Indian-owned 
lands generally are as subject to condemnation as any 
others. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kan. Ry., 135 U.S. 
641, 655-56 (1890); 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain§ 2.212, 
al 2-126 (3d rev. ed. 1976). The Supreme Court has even 
held on two occasions that where the Wyandotte Indians 
ceded their lands to the United States, specifically 
excepting a parcel to be used in perpetuity for burial 
purposes (as the Cherokees did not), the United States 
could nevertheless remove the burials and sell the parcel. 
9_<?_f1ley v. J3allinger, 216 U.S. 84, 90-91 (1910); City of 
Kansa~-~i!Y v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 179, 181-82 
(D. Kan. 19b0) (three-judge court), summarily aff'd, 365 
u.s. 568 (1961). 
The following factual considerations would 
necessitate rejection of plaintiffs' demands even apart 
from the legal principles stated above: 
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1. Plaintiffs' November 29 memorandum gives 
t impression that all 1,140 disinterred remains are 
rokee remains. In fact, only 185 are Cherokee remains. 
The other 955 are remains from earlier and different cul-
tures, as to which plaintiffs have no special interest. 
2. None of the remains were originally 
interred in marked grav~s. They were disinterred, along 
with portions of sites, in accordance with a careful 
archaeological study undertaken to carry out the policies 
stated in the National Historic Preservation Act and 
other legislation, and in Executive Order No. 11,593. 
(Plaintiffs have suggested that the disinterments were 
improper--and even, in one of the attachments to their 
November 29 motion, that they amounted to "grave robbing. '1 
We appended for the Court's information as Attachment A 
to our memorandum in opposition to that motion a statement 
outlining the reasons for the disinterments and the manner 
in which th(•y were made.) 
3. TVA long ago made plans for the eventual 
reinterment of the Cherokee remains in a memorial park at 
the site of the principal Cherokee village of Chota, to 
which Cherokees will have access. See 371 F. Supp. 1004, 
1008 and n.<J. A portion of this site has been raised 
well above the level of Tellico Reservoir. These plans 
were approvt~d by the Cherokee Nation and by plaintiff 
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___ j 
stern Band itself (see letter from Principal Chief 
included in Attachment A, supra). Plaintiff Eastern 
Band has since changed its mind. The Cherokee Nation, 
which comprises the great majority of Cherokees, has not, 
r 
and to the contrary continues to support these plans (see 
affidavit of Principal Chief Ross 0. Swimmer reprinted as 
an appendix to this brief). 
Plaintiffs, in advancing their demands, are 
thus speaking for only a minority of Cherokees themselves. 
4. It would be physically impossible to 
comply with plaintiffs' demands. A number of Cherokee 
as well as other Indian remains were disinterred from 
sites which have since been altered. Other sites were at 
elevations which are already flooded by the reservoir, 
and still others will be so flooded within a few days. 
5. Operation of Tellico to partially comply 
with plaintiffs' demands would be incompatible with the 
TVA Act and the public interest. 
Section 9a of the TVA Act provides that: 
The board is hereby directed in the operation 
of any dam or reservoir in its possession and 
control to regulate the stream flow primarily 
for the purposes of promoting navigation and 
controlling floods. So far as may be consis-
tent with such purposes, the board is author-
ized to provide and operate facilities for 
the generation of electric energy ... [16 
u.s.c. § 83lh-l (1976)]. 
The recently enacted Public Law No. 96-69 further 
provides th. 1t: 
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(T]he Corporation is authorized and directed 
to complete construction, oeerate and maintain 
the Tellico Dam and Reservo1r project for navi-
gation, flood control, electric power generation 
and other purposes, including the maintenance 
of a normal summer reservoir pool of 813 feet 
above sea level [emphasis added]. 
What plaintiffs demand is, in essence, the non-
eration of Tellico for its statutory purposes. Tellico 
is now .:m integral part ol TVA's entire unified system of 
dams and reservoirs. To control the future operation of 
Tellico so as to comply with plaintiffs' demands would be 
wholly at variance with the statute and--particularly at 
Lhe beginning of the season of winter floods and peak 
power demands--with the public interest. The reasons are 
spelled out in the affidavit of Robert A. Shelton appended 
as Attachment B to TVA's memorandum in opposition to 
plaintiffs' November 29 motion. As Mr. Shelton there 
pointed out, operation of Tellico in accordance with its 
planned design requires that a canal be opened between 
it and TVA's Fort Loudoun Reservoir and the two reser-
voirs operated together as soon as Tellico Reservoir 
reaches elevation 807, which is expected to occur before 
the end of this month. This is necessary from a safety 
standpoint Ln the event of a major flood, as well as to 
obtain Tellico's designed power and navigation benefits. 
Meanwhile, because of the need to discharge water from 
the key Fontana Dam above Tellico in preparation for the 
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imminent winter flood season, Tellico could not safely be 
drawn below its present level (and is a~tually in the 
process of rising toward the 807 level). 
The control of TVA's dam and reservoir system 
requires exercise of the highest degree of engineering 
judgment c.HJ.d discretion. See, ~' Douglas Dev. Corp. 
v. }~n~essee Valley Authority, 595 F.2d 1222 (No. 77-1154) 
(6th Cir. 1979); Spillway Marina, Inc. v. United States, 
445 F.2d 876, 877 (lOth Cir. 1971); Atchley v. Tennessee 
VaU~_Al!~hori_!,y, 69 F. Supp. 952, 954-56 (N.D. Ala. 
1947). Accepted legal principles would preclude in any 
event control through injunction of the performance of 
such discretionary engineering functions affecting the 
well-being of millions of people. Cf. Huntt v. Govern-
~~~-~~ __ of__Y_:_l_~, 382 F. 2d 38, 45-.46 (3d Cir. 1967), and 
cases cited. 
III 
]~!}~c~~_peal Should Be Dismissed as Moot. 
The plaintiffs have represented to both this 
Court and the Supreme Court that closure of Tellico would 
r-t'nder the appeal moot. Their November 9 application to 
the Supreme Court for an injunction pending appeal (at 3) 
and their November 16 petition for a rehearing by this 
Court of its November 9 denial of such relief (at 4) 
each contained the following statement: 
36 
Once flooding commences the [TVA] will 
have started an irreversible process which 
will result in the destruction of holy and 
religious sites which are fundamental to the 
traditional Cherokee religion and belief sys-
tem. The legal and constitutional questions 
raised by this case will then be mooted and 
the [plaintiffs] will have been denied any 
possibility of relief without benefit of the 
appeal process. 
Similar slatements were made in their November 4 memoran-
dum in supp<lrt of their first motion in this Court for an 
injunction pending appeal (at 10, 25); their November 5 
reply to TVA's brief in opposition (at 2); their 
November 9 memorandum in support of their application to 
the Supreme Court (at 5-6, 20); and their November 16 
motion in this Court to expedite the hearing (at 2). 
Plaintiffs' various requests for an injunction 
to prevent closure of the dam and commencement of flooding 
were denied. Tellico was closed, flooding began, and the 
level of the water has since risen 61 feet. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the 
district court should be affirmed or the appeal dismissed 
as moot. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Herbert S. Sanger, Jr. 
General Counsel 
Tennessee Valley Authority 
Knoxville, Tennessee 
Justin M. Schwamm, Sr. 
Assistant General Counsel 
James E. Fox 
Assistant General Counsel 
Michael R. McElroy 
Attorneys for 
Tennessee Valley Authority 
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APPENDIX 
UNITED ST,\TES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
NORTHERN DIVISION 
AHNONETA SEQUOYAH. ET AL. 
Plaintiffs 
v. 
Civil Action 
No. 3-79-418 
TENN!::SSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 
Defendant 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROSS 0. S\HHMER 
STATE OF OKLAHO~~ 
COUNTY OF -CHEROKEE ~ ss 
Ross 0. Swimmer, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says: 
I am the Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation, 
which consists of over 50,000 members with headquarters in 
Tahlequah, Oklahoma. I am also an attorney and am president of 
the First National Bank of Tahlequah. I have read the complaint 
which has been filed in this matter, and I have personal know-
ledge of the matters stated in this affidavit. 
The Cherokee Nation is not a party to this suit. The 
United Ketooah Band of Cherokee Indians, one of the plaintiffs 
in this action, is a group located primarily in the counties of 
eRstcrn Oklahoma. The Ketooah Band does not speak for or on 
behalf of the Cherokee Nation. [ndeed, the Cherokee Nafion has 
recently sued this Band for activities which w~ do not believe 
are in the best interests of the Cherokee Nation. 
Similarly, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, 
located at Cherokee, North Carolina, is not a part of the 
Cherokee Nation, and it does not speak for or on behalf of the 
members of the Cherokee Nation. See Eastern Band of Cherokee 
Indians v. United States and Cherokee Nation, 117 U.S. 288 
(1886). 
The allegation of the individual Cherokees in the 
complaint that this action is on behalf of "all those present 
or future Cherokee Indians who practice the traditional Cherokee 
religion and adhere to Cherokee Indian religion and culture" is 
unfounded, since members· of the Cherokee Nation centered in 
Oklahoma practice the traditional Cherokee religion and the 
Cherokee Nation, ·after specifically having been asked to do so, 
has declined to participate in this suit. 
The Cherokee Nation has been aware for many years of 
TVA's plans for the former Cherokee village sites in the Tellico 
Prpject area. TVA and The University of Tennessee have worked 
with the Cherokee Nation and solicited our participation in 
formulating those plans. We commended them for the archae-
ological work being done at these sites. Principal Chief W. W. 
Keeler, my predecessor, sent a subcommittee from the Cherokee 
Nation to inspect the archaeological work at some of these 
sites on April 10 and 11, 1972. TVA's plans, which include the 
preservation of the historically significant site of the Town-
house of the 18th Century capital of the Overhill Cherokees at 
Chota, were explained to the subcommittee. The report of the 
subcommittee, prepared by Colonel Martin A. Hagerstrand, is 
attached to this affidavit as Exhibit 1. The report states that 
the purpose of the visit was to: 
observe the activities of TVA with respect to 
archaeological investigations and preservation plans 
involving the ancient Cherokee historic sites along 
the Little Tennessee River; to assess the con@itment 
of TVA to such identification and preservation; to 
analyse to the extent practicable any pertinent factor 
involved in the current controversies regarding future 
development of the Little Tennessee River; and to make 
recommendations to the Committee with respect to the 
controversies surrounding this development. 
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The subeommittee concluded that there was "no rational 
basis for further injecting the Cherokee Nation or Cherokee 
people into the controversial questions involving further 
development by TVA of the Little Tennessee River basin" and 
that the "TVA organization and The University of Tennessee, 
along with the National Park Service should be commended for 
efforts to date to explore and develop those identifiable 
Cherokee historic sites and to recover satisfactory evidences 
of the Cherokee past." This report was adopted by the Committee 
and by Chief Keeler on behalf of the Cherokee Nation as its 
official position on the matter, and it continues to be our 
position today. 
There are a number of areas in the Eastern United 
States, including many former Cherokee village sites, which are 
historically and culturally significant to the Cherokee people, 
and which will not be affected by the Tellico project, particu-
larly the capital at New Echota, Georgia. Before TVA acquired 
the lands involved in the Tellico Project, the Cherokee people 
had only limited information about the history and culture of 
their ancestors in the Tellico project area, and the locations 
of the various tmoJn sites in the vicinity were known only in a 
general way. The land in'the Tellico area was privately owned 
by non-Indians until TVA acquired it, and the Cherokees have had 
no access to the area since the early 1800's, either individually 
or collectively. 
~lthough few of us have visited the Tellico area, we 
are grateful to TVA, because when it acquired the land !or the 
Tellico project, it caused extensive archaeological work to be 
performed in the area. This led to the discovery of the exact 
location of several Cherokee town sites, includfng Chota, the 
capital of the Overhill Cherokees; the precise location of the 
To~nhouse at Chota; the burial site of Oconastota, one of the 
Cherokee Nation's noted Chiefs, and much other culturally and 
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hi~aoricJlly signific.mt information about the Cherokee people. 
TVA has agreed to make a representative collection of the 
archaeological materials recovered available for study and 
display in the museum of the Cherokee Nation at Tahlequah. In 
addition, TVA has agreed to preserve the site of the Townhouse 
at Chota, and has allowed Cherokee youth to participate in the 
archaeological work in the area, including the removal of 
Cherokee burials for study. We also appreciate TVA's commitment 
to reinter Cherokee skeletal remains in a memorial park over-
looking Chota and regard this as additional consideration of 
the cultural and historic traditions of the Cherokee people. 
The importance of this area to the Cherokee people 
lies in the increased knowledge of Cherokee culture and history 
that has been made available to all Cherokees through TVA's 
·efforts. Hit were 11;0t for the Tellico project, much of this 
"knowledge might never have been .recovered. TVA's preservation 
the To1vnhouse site at Chota and its putting it in public owner-
ship for the first time affords all Cherokees the opportunity 
to visit at will this very significant, but previously inacces-
sible site. 
While the great majority of the Cherokee people long 
of 
ago adopted the Christian-faith as their religion, some Cherokees 
adhere to the religious traditions of our people. Just as is 
the ca! e with Christi~ns, it does not matter where they live or 
worship. A Cherokee who follows the religious traditions of 
.the Cherokee people is not required by those traditions·to 
visit any particular place or area in the eastern United States 
in the exercise of his beliefs. The village sites in the lower 
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Little ·rennessee River are important to the cultural history of 
the Cherokee Nation, but are not a part of its religion. 
Sworn to and subscribed before me 
Ross 0. Sw1nuuer 
Principal Chief 
Cherokee Nation 
Tahlequah, Oklahoma 
this day of 
------' 1979. 
NOtary Pubhc 
My commission expires: 
CHEROKEE. NATIO~ 
April 17, 1-)7:2 
Dear Chief: 
I-a~ pleased-to trans~it herewit~ photocopy of 
· the Report of thc TVJ. ~."t;.b-Co:-: ... ""JittGe of April 14, 1972. 
Copies of same are being mailed this date t~ the ~c8bers of the ~ain Cherokee Nat~on TVA Committee with t~e su,scestio:;:;. that if 2.-:'.Y He:-:·:':::.8:::.~ of the rr.ain Con::-:ittee 
desires to take an exception to any state~ent made in 
th8 ~eport ·chat tf.ey either pho~c or '·l!'i te we irr .... 11edia tely .. 
If ,,.ri thin t:~.ree dz.ys of the mailii,g of this Repor"'c 
to 
··o·· r:o e"c"'p ..... -:o...., ..,..~~ ''e"'""' -'-··'·en ..: ... "'"" rny •-r~ch ... h ..... :; u. ~ .,.. ~,;; L...:.. ••. d..;.-=> ,; \J:• v.: .. · •• , .L v ..... .;;) . .._ ...... v o v 
you cc::-:s icier th~s Sub- Co:-.".!"Tii·t. t-:: ~ :le~ort as the Report of 
tll.c rr:c.i.:::. CO!Y':.'.i-;:,tec. I •.-;ill phone r-:::.~ •• !:.nt;el on Friday of 
this v.r2e::.;: to am:o-..:nce the recei-ot of anv obJ"ection .. .. ~ -
·.-;c '\·rish to than.k · 
C?:cro:<ee Na tio:'. .. 
Since:::.:: ely, 
c J . J ~ 
<A'.{A; .1):. c/ L~ /~c_:._C:::. 
E:'.l-U... '!:OYJ p . .,ERC:S 
Gc~cral Cou~sel ~:::.d 
Ch.J.i:c:na:-~ oi the Chcrol~c o 
.r~ u. -c. ion TV;. Co:-:--'T:i t tc ..-.:; 
R E P 0 R T 
TO: The Cherokee Nation TV
A Committee 
FROM: The Cherokee Nation TVA 
Sub-Committee 
DATE: April 14, 1972 
On February 13, 1972, you elec
ted a Sub-Committee to visi\·, 
and observe at first hand the
 situation with respect to a
ncient . 
Cherokee historic sites on th
e banks of the Little Tennes
see River 
development area. 
Because of the limited resour
ces of the Cherokee Nation, 
a reque.st was made to the TVA
 for transportation which wa
s pro-
vided by that·Authority.to an
d from Knoxville, Tennessee. 
Com-
mittee Members and others who
 made the trip are as follo\'.r
s: 
Johnnye ChoppGr,. Jay, Chairman; 
Rex Presley, 
Hrs. Marion Hagerstrand, Mr. 
Oscar \'lelch, all 
of Tahlequah; and Miss Annie 
Meigs of Fort 
Gibson; and Mr. Hiner Doubleh
ead of Stilwell. 
In addition the follo1rlng per
sons accompanied 
the Com1nittee: ·~Mr. Earl Eoyd
 Pierce, General 
Counsel, Cherokee Nation, and
 Chairman of the 
main TVA. Committee; Dr .. and M
rs .. Robert Collins 
of Muskogee (guests of Mr .. Pete Cla
ussen, TVA 
Attorney); and Colonel l•lartin A .. Hag
erstrand, 
Executive Vice President, Ch
erokee National 
Historical Society and studen
t of Cherokee 
arc;haeology .. 
The Sub-Committee departed fr
om lJ!uskogee at 8:15 a .. m., 
~1onday, April 10, arriving at 
Knoxville at 11:45 a.m.. TVA 
Boarc' 
Member Don McBrid~ and TVA A
ttorney, Pete Claussen, accom
panied 
the Committee en route to Kn
oxville. vle returned April 1
1th at 
7:JO p.m. 
· 
After an orientation coverin
g the developments on the 
Li ttlc Tennessee Ri 'ter, the 
Committee toured the length o
f the 
River by air, noting those id
entified historic eherokee si
tes, 
as well as construction prog
ress on the project. 
The following day, the Comm
ittee toured the area.by car 
visiting somo of tho historic
 sites, including the restore
d 
historic Fort Loudon and the 
site of ancient Chota. The p
urposes 
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April 11.., 1972 
of the visit as identified by your Sub-Co~uittee w
are to observe 
the activities of TVA with respect to archaeologi
cal investigations 
and preservation plans involving the ancient Chero
kee historic 
sites along the Little Tennessee River; to assess 
the co~nitment 
of· TVA to such identification and preservation; to
 analyse to the 
extent practicable any pertinent factor involved i
n the current 
controversies regarding future development of the 
Little Tennessee 
River; and to make recommendations to the Committe
e with respect 
to_ the controversies surrounding this development. 
The Sub-Committee was briefed by various specialis
ts and 
by representatives of the University of Tennessee r
egarding Chero-
kee historical rcsearche The history of TVA develo
pment in the 
area was presented, along with the record of five 
years of TVA 
interest ahd i"nvestment in archaeological investig
ations along 
the River. 
· 
It is the judgment of the Sub-Committee that all presentation~ 
were factual and objective, as \'fell as open and fair.. Questions 
asked v1ere answered iri th complete candor in so far
 as could be de-
termined. Economic factors behind the proposed de
velopment were 
outlined along i'lith proposed future plans. The ba
ses for opposition 
to further development 'lvere enurnera ted. \•le revie1·-1
ed by slide pre-
sentations and discussion a partial record of arch
aeological exca-
vations in the area to date and saw some of the ar
ticles recovered 
and in the custody of the l\kClung Huseum of the Un
iversity of 
Tennessee. 
In· final conference 1·ri th IJ!r. A .. J .. Wagner, Chairma
n of the 
Board of TVA~ Board rJJember Don rJicBride, Mr .. Robert
 H .. Marquis, 
General Counsel, R .. Lynn Seeber, General Manager, 
and other TVA' 
managerial repres0ntatives, along ~th Dr. Alfred K .. 
·cuthe, Director 
of the HcClunb Nuseum, University of Tennessee, wh
o is in charge of 
archaeoloeical investigations on the Little Tenne
ssee River, it _ 
was stated and abreed by TVA that {1) archaeological investigations 
would be continued; (2) the sites of Fort Loudon, Tellico Blo
ck 
House, and Chota could be and would be protected b
y appropriate 
means for future development; (J) mutually sati~factory ar
range-
ments could be made regarding custody and display 
of appropriate 
artifacts important to the Cherokee Nation. 
Report to Cherokee Nation TVA Committee 
Par.:e J 
April J.h, 1972 
co~~cr.u~ro~r~: 
1. Representations by TVA to 
Committee appeared ctual, obje Committee and Sub-and c id • 
. 2. Based on the breadth and depth of the facts presented 
to the Sub-Committee regarding the extent of TVA past and presen· .. 
interest in historical aspects involved, the siting Cherokee Sub,~ 
Corr.r.:i ttec l'ound no rational. basis !'or :n.trther jecting the Chero-
kee Nation or Cherokee peop.Le into the controversial. questions · ·· 
involving further development· by TVA of the ttle Tennessee 
lh vor basin .. 
3.. An opportunity has been 
those opposed to further development 
basin to'be heard by the.Sub-Cornmittee., 
representatives of 
ttle Tennessee 
4. TVA or~anization and the University of Tennissee, 
alonE: \V'ith the National Park Service should be comrn.endeCl for 
efforts to date to explore and develop those identifiable Cherokee 
historic sites and to recover satisfactory evidences of the Chero-
kee past .. 
· 1.. Based on findings date the Cherokee Nation should 
not become involved in any v;ay .the current controversies over 
future development of the Little Tennessee River basin. 
2.· Continuing follmv-up effort should be made by the 
Cherokee National Historical Society to secure an adequate and 
rapresentative co ction Cherokee artifacts excavated from 
the ancient Cherokee to'>·ms for display the Cherokee National 
Mus eu.'il .. 
The above .report, prepared by Colonel Martin A® Hagerstrand, 
was read, consijzed, and adopted this _14th day of ~pril, J..972 . 
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